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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY GRIFFITHS, as guardian 
ad litem for KEVIN G. MEEHAN, 
and PATRICK B. MEEHAN; and 
MARIAN J. MEEHAN, Case No. 900595 
Plainttffs/Appellants, Priority N •  1* 
vs. 
J. DALLAS VANWAGONER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATF O F TTTAW 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE ACTION 
The caption of ihe cast.' contains the names of all parties to the action. 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (1987 replacement volume & supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. Issues, 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Is, the J yeai sltdiie of I imitations set foi in Utah Code Ann. § 78 14 4 
(1987), as it applies to minors, unconstitutional under the due process, "open t ourts," 
and equal protection clauses of the Utah Constitution (Art. I, §§ 7, 11 arid 24, 
respectively)? 
2. Is the 4-year statute of repose inch ided ii i I Jtah Code Ai n :i § 78-14-4 
(1987) unconstitutional under the due process, "open courts," and equal protection 
clauses in Art I, §§ 7, 11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution, respectively? 
3. Do I he terms «") 'he 2-year statute of limitations included in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987) apply to mentally disabled, minor plaintiffs? 
B. Standard of Review, 
All three o( the above issues present questions of law only, and conclusions 
reached by the trial court are, therefore, iaccorded no par tici ilai deference Iliis Court 
should review those conclusions for correctness. See Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 
784 P 2d 1152, 1154 (13 tah 1989); City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement 
Board. 767 P.2d 530, 532 (L)tah 19881, 
2 
RELATED APPEALS 
Lee v. Gaufin. Case Nos. 20995 and 21063, involves virtually identical issues 
to those presented in this case. Lee v. Gaufin has been fully briefed and argued and 
is presently pending before this Court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The relevant provisions and statutes are as set forth in the Brief of Appellants 
on pg. 1 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court 
Below. 
Defendant/Respondent J. Dallas VanWagoner ("defendant") agrees with the 
description of the nati ire ol tl ie case, coin se of proceedings and disposition as set forth 
in the Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants, Gary Griffiths as guardian ad liteni for 
Kevin G. Meehan and Patrick B. Meehan; and Marian J. Meehan ("plaintiffs"). 
B. Response to Plaintiffs* Statement of Facts, 
1. On iyai, IV - -wemature 
twins, Kevin and Patrick Meehan. Record at 152. 
2. In their Complaint, plaintiffs allege negligent treatment by defendant 
resulted in brain damage to tl ie tw o 28 week twii is following a premature labor and 
delivery. Record at 3. 
3. Plaintiffs served a Notice of Intent to Commence Medical Malpractice 
litigation on or about August or September, 1988. Record at 157. • 
1 
4. On or about l<imiai y U \{W) plaintiffs liletl a < omplaint in this action in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Plaintiffs caused 
a Summons and Complaint to be served on defendant on or about January 20, 1989. 
Record at 2. 
5. On May 16, 1990 defendant filed a Motion ic Dismiss the Complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The grounds for 
defendant's motion was that the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4 (1987) bars plaintiffs' claims Record at II 32. 
6. The District Court entered an Order of Dismissal With Prejudice in favor 
of defendant on or about December 6, 1990. Record at 166. A copy of the court's 
Findings of t in I, Conclusions of Law and Order are included as Exhibit "A" in the 
Addendum hereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 does not violate the rights of minors under the 
"open cour is,' " "din* process," or "equal protection" provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The open courts analysis articulated in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 
670, 680 (I I tal i 1985), is i lot applicable because no abrogation or denial of a remedy 
is involved in this case. Even if the Berry analysis were applied, it woi ild be satisfied 
because § 78-14-4 allows comparable substantive protection and is a reasonable means 
of achieving the elimination of a clear social or economic evil. 
4 
Substai itive due process analysis is properly applied only in cases of "extreme 
arbitrariness," of which this case is not one. Nonetheless, under Utah law, 
substantive due process analysis in cases such as this is indistinguishable from the 
Berry analysis and, as discussed under the open courts section of this brief, § 78-14-4 
passes constitutional muster undei tl lat analysis. 
Equal protection analysis in this case should apply the "rational basis" standard 
of review because § 78-14-4 does not deny any constitutional right under the "open 
courts" provisioi i Uimln „i lalional basis lest, § 78-14-4 is reasonably appropriate to 
accomplish its intended purpose and therefore constitutional. Even if an intermediate 
standard of review were applied, any statutory classifications which might exist have 
been found to be reasonable and in fact substantially further the legislative purpose. 
The four year statute of repose in $ 7K 14 4 also satisfies the Berry test, as 
recognized by this Court in Berry itself. 
As a matter of statutory construction, the two year statute of limitations in 
§ 78-P 4 does j'uply U« the Iwo minoi appellants. Sivtion 7K 14 4 is the express 
result of the legislature's decision to leave adults and minors with medical malpractice 
claims on equal footing. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPLICATION OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO MINORS IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The first issue raised by plaintiffs is whethei tl ic I Jtah legislatui e i nay 
constitutionally exclude the minors tolling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36, from 
applying to the medical malpractice statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. 
Plaintiffs challenge the UUISIIIIIIJOIKIIIIV n( ULiIi ( ode Ann § /K 1 •* 4 as applied to 
minors on three grounds: (1) the statute violates Article I, Section n of the Utah 
Constitution relating to a litigant's right of access to the courts, (2) the statute violates 
Article I, Section ' oil Hit" Utah Constitution relating to due process, and (3) the statute 
violates state constitutional guarantees of eqi lal pr otec tioi i of laws ( \rticle I. Section. 
24). (Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-15).1' 
A. § 78-14-4 does not violate the rights of minors under the "Open 
Courts11 provision of the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution is referred to as the "< >pen 
Courts" provision based upon its declaration that tf[a]ll courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his person, . . . shall have a remedy by due 
17
 In this appeal, plaintiffs have not distinguished between their varying 
individual circumstances as they apply to the issues raised. Both Kevin and Patrick 
Meehan were minors at the commencement of this action. A guardian ad litem, Gary 
Griffiths filed claims on their behalf. Their mother Marian Meehan Griffiths, 
however, is also a plaintiff and appellant in this action and was not a minor at the 
commencement of the action. Thus, plaintiffs' argument on the statute of limitations 
as applied to minors does not pertain to Marian Meehan Griffith's claims. 
i 
course of law." See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that no one has a vested right in a common 
law cause of action and the legislature may pass laws restricting or abrogating rights 
of action. Such laws, however, must pass constitutional muster. Id. at 675-76. 
In Berry, this Court held that the open courts provision and the prerogative of 
the legislature are properly accommodated by a specific two-part analysis. Id. at 680. 
The first part was articulated by the Court as follows: 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured 
person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by due 
course of law" for vindication of his constitutional interest. 
The benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially 
equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in 
providing essentially comparable substantive protection to 
one's person, property, or reputation, although the form of 
the substitute remedy may be different. 
Id. at 680. 
The analysis articulated in Berry is thus premised on the abrogation of a remedy. 
The instant case does not involve an abrogation of a remedy, and, even if it did, 
comparable substantive protection is afforded. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 treats all injured persons equally. Minors and 
incompetents have the same remedies available to them that competent adults possess. 
The only difference is that the action must be pursued by a guardian on behalf of the 
minor or incompetent, which would be the case regardless of the application of statute 
of limitations. Because both Patrick and Kevin Meehan were permanently mentally 
disabled, striking the statute of limitations would not provide them any further remedy. 
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They would still have to rely upon a guardian to bring an action on their behalf. To 
suggest, as plaintiffs do, that Kevin and Patrick were deprived because no one could act 
for them is inaccurate. They were deprived or disabled by their condition - not by any 
act of the legislature. According to plaintiffs, Kevin and Patrick will never be able to 
bring their own claims because of their personal disability. 
It is certainly reasonable to put a limit on the time in which a guardian has to bring 
the claims on a minor's behalf. To do otherwise would bring about the absurd result that 
a mentally disabled person would have his or her entire life span to bring a claim relating 
to negligence at the time of birth. 
Moreover, experience has shown that, in reality, minors have had comparable 
substantive protection of their rights. Current statistics demonstrate that one-seventh of 
all medical malpractice claims involve minors. Jenkens, California's Medical Injury 
Compensation Reform Act, An Equal Protection Challenge. 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 829, 960-
61 (1979). In Utah, assuming that one-seventh of the 30 malpractice claims being filed 
each month are brought by minors, 51 malpractice claims are being brought by minors 
within the statutory periods each year. In contrast, only four tardy claims, stating 
constitutional challenges against Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 have surfaced in the fifteen-
year period since Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 was enacted in 1976. See Hargett v. 
Limberg, 598 F. Supp 152 (D. Utah 1984); Blum v. Stone. 752 P.2d 898 (Utah 1988); 
Lee v. Gaufin. Case Nos. 20995 and 21063 (currently pending before this court); and the 
instant case. 
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Furthermore, it is evident that minors' medical malpractice claims are being both 
heard and vindicated in Utah courts with increasingly greater damage recoveries being 
awarded. In 1983, a Utah jury awarded $4,775,000 to the mother of a child who was 
born a spastic quadriplegic because of an attending physician's misuse of a labor inducing 
drug. Jury Verdict Research, Inc. Personal Injury Verdict Survey. Utah Edition 7 
(1983). In Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.. 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984), this Court 
affirmed a $1.5 million jury verdict in a products liability action brought by the parents 
of Elizabeth Ann Barson, who suffered serious birth defects resulting from negligent 
prenatal administration of a progestational drug. These and other cases, coupled with the 
number of timely claims made by Utah minors demonstrate that the Utah courts' doors 
are open to all medical malpractice claims whether brought by adults or on behalf of 
minors. 
The Constitution has never required special, separate treatment of minors. "It is 
within the legislative competency" of states to make special exceptions in [minors'] favor 
or not." Vance v. Vance. 108 U.S. 514, 521 (1888); see also Murray v. City of 
Milford. 380 F.2d 468, 473 (2nd Cir. 1967); Maine Medical Center v. Cote. 577 A.2d 
1173, 1177 (Maine 1990); Shaw v. Zabel. 517 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Ore. 1974); Lametta 
v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.. 92 A.2d 731, 733 (Conn. 1952). In Hargett v. 
Limberg. 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984) (reversed on other grounds) Judge Winder 
specifically stated: 
9 
It is universally accepted that a legislature may put adults and 
infants on the same footing with respect to statutes of 
limitations without affecting constitutional rights. 
598 F. Supp. at 156. Because minors have no special rights beyond others, removal of 
the exception of the Utah tolling statute, should not be viewed as an "abrogation of a 
remedy or cause of action" within the meaning of the Berry open courts analysis. 
Even if an abrogation were involved and no comparable substantive protection 
provided, § 78-14-4, is justified under the second part of the Berry analysis: 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy 
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be 
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be 
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. 
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care. 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981), this court upheld 
the constitutionality of § 78-14-4 as applied to adults. The Court considered the express 
legislative findings regarding the mounting medical malpractice insurance crisis and 
recognized the justification for application of the statute of limitations: 
It is therefore seen that the [Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act] was premised on the need to protect and insure the 
continued availability of health care services to the public, and 
not (as asserted by plaintiff) to shield insurance companies 
from legitimate claims. The legislature exercised its 
discretionary prerogative in determining that the shortening of 
the statute of limitation (along with requiring notice of 
intention to sue), would insure the continued availability of 
adequate health care services. 
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Allen. 635 P.2d at 32. If § 78-14-4 is reasonable and justified for adults, then surely it 
is for minors as well. 
As this case demonstrates, if the legislature were precluded from applying the 
statute of limitations, malpractice claims could be brought at anytime. The statute of 
limitations for a medical malpractice claim for Kevin and Patrick and other mentally 
disabled persons would never commence to run, and an action on their behalf could be 
instituted many decades after the cause of action allegedly arises. The potential liability 
of health care providers and the exposure to liability of professional malpractice liability 
insurers would become increasingly unpredictable and indefinite. Defendants would be 
unable to determine the extent of personal exposure and insurers would be unable to 
calculate premiums to cover their exposure. 
Because the insurance industry depends on predictability to determine premiums 
and maintain sufficient reserves, many insurers would respond to the threat of uncertainty 
and problems related to defending against stale claims by withdrawing from malpractice 
liability insurance markets. Note, The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative 
Surgery on Patient's Rights, Vol. 10, Val. U. L. Rev. 303, 305 n. 10 (1976). 
It was the specter of this medical malpractice crisis which led the Federal District 
Court for the District of Utah to conclude: 
[T] he exclusion of minors and legally incompetent persons 
from the general tolling provisions (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-36) is rationally related to the stated purpose of 
containing the malpractice insurance crisis. That rationality 
is particularly evidenced by the facts of the present case. 
Serious permanent injuries to children are often cases of large 
11 
potential damages. If the period in which such claims could 
be brought were tolled until the young child reached the age 
of majority, a heavy burden would be placed on insurance 
carriers in evaluating and defending against the claim, 
establishing appropriate reserve requirements, and setting 
rates. The percentage of medical malpractice claims brought 
by minors is far from insignificant. Moreover, the 
uncertainty inherent in tolling the period in which such claims 
may be brought could drastically affect insurance rates . . . 
Hargett v. Limberg. 598 F. Supp. at 158 (reversed on other grounds). Hence, § 78-14-4 
is absolutely necessary to insure the continued availability of health care services in Utah 
by containing the malpractice insurance crisis. The malpractice insurance crisis is a 
"clear social and economic evil" to be eliminated and § 78-14-4 is a reasonable means 
for achieving that objective. 
In Berry, this Court expressly recognized that the Allen decision upholding the 
constitutionality of § 78-14-4 is consistent with the Berry open courts analysis. Berry. 
717 P.2d at 683. The medical malpractice statute of limitations as applied to minors is 
not unconstitutional under the open courts test adopted by the court in Berry. 
B. § 78-14-4. as applied to minors, does not violate the Due Process 
clause of the Utah Constitution. 
The due process provision of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7. 
Federal courts abandoned any application of federal substantive due process 
analysis long ago. Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348, 369 (Utah 1989) 
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(Stewart). Although not wholly abandoned in some states, including Utah, substantive 
due process analysis is applied only in cases of "extreme arbitrariness." Id. 
In Condemarin. Justice Stewart found that a statute placing a complete bar on 
recovering any damages in excess of $100,000 from a governmental entity did not involve 
the extreme arbitrariness which would warrant substantive due process analysis. Id. 
Certainly then, the instant case which involves a statute placing a mere time limit on the 
filing of claims is not one of extreme arbitrariness. The more appropriate analysis for 
this case is the equal protection analysis discussed under Point I.C. Id. See Allen at 32. 
Nonetheless, if this Court were to find "extreme arbitrariness" in the application 
of § 78-14-4 in this case, the appropriate due process analysis would be virtually identical 
to the "classic due process analysis" embodied by the two-part Berry test discussed above 
under Point I. A. See Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 357 (Durham) and at 369 (Stewart). 
The test articulated in Berry is essentially a due process balancing test in which "the 
exigencies associated with the social or economic evils addressed by the legislation are 
weighed against the reasonableness of its intrusion on personal rights." It also includes 
a separate "substitute remedy" due process test. Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 360 (Durham) 
and at 367 (Zimmerman). As explained under Point I.A., supra, § 78-14-4 passes 
constitutional muster under the two-part Berry analysis. 
C. § 78-14-4. as applied to minors, does not violate the Equal 
Protection clause of the Utah Constitution. 
Utah's Equal Protection clause, Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
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The first step in applying Article I, Section 24 is to determine 
the appropriate standard of review for evaluating the 
lawfulness of the discriminatory classifications. Not all such 
classifications are unconstitutional. 
Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 372 (Utah 1989) (Stewart). 
The "strict scrutiny" standard of review applies only where legislation creates a 
"suspect class" or affect a "fundamental right." Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 674 n. 
17 (Utah 1984). The United States District Court for the District of Utah has already 
rejected the argument for applying a "heightened scrutiny" standard of review to a 
minor's constitutional challenge to the Utah medical malpractice statute of limitations: 
Unlike alienage, illegitimacy or gender, the class of minors 
with medical malpractice claims does not involve a 
fundamental interest or a classification of a suspect character 
. . . The correct standard for equal protection analysis to be 
applied in this case under both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions is the rational basis test. 
Hargett v. Limberg. 598 F.Supp. 152, 157 (D. Utah 1984). 
Where a constitutional right is denied, however, this Court has recognized the 
appropriateness of applying an "intermediate" or "heightened" standard of review. 
Condemarin. at 373 (Stewart); Malan. at 671. It is this intermediate standard which 
plaintiffs urge the Court to apply in instant case. 
When the discrimination reviewed under the Equal Protection clause does not deny 
a constitutional right under Article I, Section 11, the standard of review is less stringent 
than the standard applied when a constitutional right is abrogated. Id. at 375. The 
validity of the discrimination will then turn upon "whether the classification is arbitrary 
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in light of the presumed purposes of the statute." Id. This is the "rational basis test." 
See Malan v.Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, (Utah 1984); Men, 635 P.2d at 31; Hargett, 598 F. 
Supp. at 157; Maine Medical. 577 A.2d 1176. Because, as discussed above under Point 
I. A., this case does not involve the denial of any right under Article I, Section 11, the 
rational basis test should be applied. 
Section 78-14-4, must be held to be a constitutional exercise of the Utah 
legislature's prerogative unless plaintiff can clearly establish that the statute does not meet 
the requirements of the rational basis standard of review. To satisfy the rational basis 
test, the statute must first apply equally to all members of the created class. Malan v. 
Lewis. Id. The class created and protected by the Act is health care providers. See 
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 634 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981). Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4 applies equally to all health care providers and therefore complies with 
the first prong of the rational basis test. 
The statute also treats equally the affected group, those persons, including minors, 
who have personal injury claims against health care providers. The classification of 
minors who are tort victims of health care providers as opposed to minors who are 
victims of other tort-feasors-7 is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of 
controlling malpractice insurance costs and ensuring continued health care services in this 
-'This classification is really created by the minors tolling statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-36. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 merely excludes its application to malpractice 
claims, assuring that all injured persons are treated equally. 
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state. See generally Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Crisis: Constitutional Implication. 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759 (1977). 
Second, to satisfy equal protection review, the different treatment afforded the 
protected class must have a "reasonable tendency" to further the legislative objective. 
Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). In Allen, this Court reviewed the 
legislative objective behind the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and held that the Act 
and its statute of limitations has such a tendency. Allen at 32. 
Judicial review of legislation does not include a reevaluation of the facts the 
legislature could have considered to determine the necessity for the enactment. The 
constitutionality of a measure under the equal protection clause does not depend on a 
court's hindsight assessment of the empirical success or failure of the measure's 
provisions. As Justice Brennan explained in Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co.. 449 
U.S. 456, 466 (1981): "whether in fact the Act will promote the [legislative objectives] 
is not the question: the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied by our conclusion that the 
[state] Legislature could rationally have decided" that the means chosen will promote the 
legislative objectives. (Emphasis added). Where there was evidence before the 
Legislature which, if believed to be true, supported the creation of the statutory 
classification, a plaintiff cannot invalidate the statute by tendering evidence to support an 
argument that the Legislature may have been mistaken. Cloverleaf. 449 U.S. at 466. 
The Federal District Court for Utah stated that the burden of weighing the need 
to contain malpractice insurance costs and the medical malpractice crisis in general and 
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thereby to ensure the availability of health care services against the competing interests 
of minors and mental incompetents whose parents or guardians fail to timely initiate an 
action is a problem to be handled by the legislature, not the courts. Hargett, 598 F. Supp 
at 158. The reasons for leaving the balancing process to the legislature are important: 
[A]ny possible harm that may be suffered by a minor whose 
parents or guardians fail to initiate the action against a 
potential tortious wrongdoer within the appropriate time 
period may be outweighed by the chaos, uncertainty, and 
severe prejudice which will occur to those accused of tortious 
conduct, their insurance carriers, and ultimately to the 
insurance carriers' rate payers when lawsuits are permitted to 
be initiated decades after the occurrence of the incident giving 
rise thereto. Before such a sweeping change is made the 
question of 'reserve requirements' imposed on insurance 
carriers and the resulting effect on insurance rates as well as 
many other issues must be addressed. The Legislature, not 
the courts, is the proper forum for the resolution of such 
issues. (Emphasis added). 
De Santis v. Yaw. 434 A.2d 1273, 1279 (Pa. Super. 1981). 
Indeed, in almost all areas, the law expects the parents or guardians will look after 
and protect the child's interest. Absent the presence of a fundamental right, parents are 
expected and allowed to exercise broad decision-making authority over their children. 
Bellotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Parham v. J.R.. 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979). 
Based upon sound and well-reasoned authorities, appropriate principles of judicial 
review, and legislative objectives underlying the Act and its statute of limitations, it is 
evident that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 complies with federal and state guarantees of 
equal protection of laws and does not deny plaintiffs access to the courts. 
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Other jurisdictions which have analyzed equal protection and due process attacks 
by minor plaintiffs against medical malpractice statutes of limitations have reached similar 
results. An example is the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Maine in Maine 
Medical Center v. Cote. 577 A.2d 1173 (Me. 1990). 
In Cote, the plaintiffs contended that Maine's medical malpractice statute of 
limitations-7 violated the "open courts" of the Maine Constitution by effectively 
precluding a child under the age of 12 when a cause of action accrues from bringing an 
action its own name. The Court stated: 
We do not construe [the open courts provision] as prohibiting 
reasonable limits on the time within which a claimant may 
seek redress in the courts. The absence of a tolling provision 
for a legal disability thus making a claimant dependent on 
another to assert his rights does not per se offend [the open 
courts provision]. The only issue of constitutional 
significance is whether such time limits are so unreasonable 
as to deny meaningful access to the judicial process. 
577 A.2d at 1176. The Court held that the Maine statute's limitations were not so 
unreasonable and thus passed constitutional muster under the open courts provision. Id. 
- The Maine statute provided: 
Actions for professional negligence shall be commenced 
within 3 years after the cause of action accrues. For the 
purpose of this section, a cause of action accrues on the 
date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Title 14, section 853, 
relating to minority, actions for professional negligence by 
a minor shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause 
of action accrues or within 3 years after the minor reaches 
the age of majority, whichever occurs first. 
24 M.R.S.A. Section 2902 (1990). 
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The Maine Court then went on to consider the plaintiffs' second argument, that the 
statute violated the equal protection clause of the Maine constitution by unfairly 
discriminating against minors with a claim of medical malpractice as opposed to minors 
with claims based on other types of negligence. Id. The Court declined to apply a "strict 
scrutiny" analysis, noting "that the pursuit of a negligence action is not a fundamental 
right" and, furthermore, that the United States Supreme Court in Vance v. Vance. 108 
U.S. 514 (1883) held that the federal constitution "gives to minors no special rights 
beyond others," and "it [is] within the legislative competency" of states "to make 
exceptions in their favor or not." Id. Instead the Court applied a rational basis standard. 
Recognizing that a statute of limitation is "of necessity a potent element in any 
reform of tort law," and that "[the] production of records and evidence necessary to meet 
medical malpractice claims becomes progressively more difficult with time," the court 
stated: 
As a court we must assume that [the statute of limitations] 
represents the legislature's considered judgment concerning 
the most effective manner of decreasing premium costs of 
medical professional liability insurance. "It is not necessary 
that the methods adopted by the legislature be the best or 
wisest choice. No matter how much the court might have 
preferred some other procedure, if the measure is reasonably 
appropriate to accomplish the intended purpose, we must give 
it effect. 
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Id. at 1177. Applying this standard, the Court held that the Maine statute was rationally 
related to the stated legislative purpose. Id. A substantial number of other state courts 
have held likewise.17 
Federal courts have reached the same conclusion concerning the operation of 
statutes of limitation against minors' claims. In Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 
972 (10th Cir. 1980) the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that "[I]t is well 
established that a claimant's minority does not toll the running of the statute of limitations 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act." In Brown v. United States. 353 F.2d 578, 579 (9th 
Cir. 1965), the court stated that minority does not toll the statute of limitations, and the 
*
7See e.g.. Donabedian v. Manzer. 200 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1984); 
Kite v. Campbell. 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 (App. 1983) (statute providing that medical 
malpractice actions by a minor must be commenced within three years from the date 
of the alleged wrongful act did not deny a minor's right to due process under law; as 
a matter of constitutional law, a statute of limitation is remedial in nature and does not 
destroy fundamental rights); Wheeler v. Lenski. 658 P.2d 1056 (Kan. App. 1983) 
(statute which shortens period of limitation for minors and incapacitated persons in 
medical malpractice actions did not violate equal protection or due process); Petri v. 
Smith. 453 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. 1982) (the settled rule is that it is not violative of 
any constitutional rights to hold minors bound equally with adults to the prescribed 
statutory periods within which legal causes of action may be brought); Reese v. 
Rankin Fite Memorial Hospital. 403 So.2d 158 (Ala. 1981) (statute of limitations did 
not violate due process and equal protection provisions of state or federal constitutions 
on ground that statute created minors injured through medical malpractice differently 
from minor victims of other torts); Thomas v. Niemann. 397 So.2d 90 (Ala. 1981) 
(minor's medical malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitations and was 
properly dismissed); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital. Inc.. 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 
1980) (time limitation effecting medical malpractice claim for death of a minor child 
was not contrary to due process and equal protection); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner. 413 
N.E.2d 891 (Ind. 1980) (court held that the legislature was not constitutionally 
mandated to suspend application of statutes of limitation in cases of infancy or 
incapacity and dismissed appeal which challenged constitutionality of statute of 
limitations of medical malpractice act). 
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parents or guardians of a minor must preserve his claim by timely action. Finally, in 
Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739, 741 (9th Cir.), cert, denied. 382 U.S. 941 
(1965), the Supreme Court found that equal protection guarantees are not violated by 
applying shortened statute of limitations to a minor's claim. 
Even if this Court were to apply the intermediate standard of equal protection 
review applied by Justice Stewart in Condemarin. § 78-14-4 passes the test. While the 
intermediate standard has more bite than the minimum scrutiny standard, it does not 
require the legislature to find the least restrictive manner of furthering its purpose. The 
statutory classifications must be reasonable and the statute must in fact reasonably and 
substantially further the legislative purpose. Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 373 (Stewart). 
The determination of reasonableness must take into account 
the extent to which the constitutional right ... is diminished 
and the extent to which the burden imposed actually furthers 
the legislative goals, as well as the importance of those goals. 
Id. This Court considered these factors in Allen and upheld the constitutionality of § 78-
14-4. See discussion, pp. 8-9, supra. 
POINT II 
THE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE IN THE 
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Plaintiffs argue that the four year medical malpractice statute of repose (Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4 [1987]) violates the due process, open courts, and equal protection 
clauses in the Utah Constitution. Appellants' Brief, pp. 44-47. Essentially, however, 
plaintiffs' argument is that all statutes of repose must be analyzed under the two-part test 
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adopted by the court in Berry and that the Medical Malpractice four year statute of repose 
included in § 78-14-4 does not pass the test. 
In support of their argument, plaintiffs rely on Berry, Sun Valley Waterbeds v. 
Hughes and Sun. 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989) and Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter. 785 
P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). All of those cases, however, are distinguishable from the instant 
case. 
In Berry, the Utah Supreme Court applied the two-part test (described above under 
Point I.A.) to invalidate a statute of repose included in the Utah Product Liability Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-1, et se^ (1953). The Court concluded that the Utah statute 
of repose with respect to product liability did not reasonably and substantially advance 
the stated purpose of the statute. The Court further held that the effect of the statute in 
that regard was "more fanciful than real," citing Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 673 
(Utah 1983), and whatever beneficial effects may have accrued from the statute of repose 
did not justify the denial of rights protected by Article I, Section 11. Berry. 717 P.2d 
at 683. 
The Berry Court, however, specifically stated: 
Prior Utah cases which have addressed the constitutionality of 
other statutes of repose are not inconsistent with our holding 
in this case. Allen v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 635 
P.2d 30 (Utah 1981), sustained the constitutionality of the 
medical malpractice statute of repose against challenges based 
on Utah's equal protection of the laws provision, Article I, 
Section 24, and the Utah constitutional prohibition against 
enactment of special laws, Article XI, Section 26. No issue 
was raised as to the constitutionality of the statute under 
Article I, Section 11. Beyond that, there was no showing that 
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the legislative purpose in enacting the statute would not be 
achieved, (emphasis added.) 
Berry. 717 P.2d at 683. If, as plaintiffs argue, there is really no difference between an 
equal protection and open courts analysis as applied to the instant case, this Court has 
already upheld the constitutionality of the medical malpractice statute of repose in Allen. 
In Horton and Sun Valley Waterbeds this Court followed the Berry test in holding 
that the Utah Architects and Builders statute of repose violated the open courts provision 
of Utah's constitution. As in Berry, the Court based its holding on a finding that there 
was no clear social or economic evil that the Architects and Builders statute of repose was 
aimed at, and that the legislature had identified none. See Horton. 785 P.2d at 1094. 
Moreover, the Court, in Horton. Sun Valley Waterbeds and Berry noted as an important 
factor the apparent counterproductivity of the statute at issue. In Sun Valley Waterbeds 
the court stated: 
The statute of repose may be counterproductive in terms of 
public safety since the statute provides architects and builders 
with less incentive to take adequate precautions in the 
designing and building of improvements that have a useful life 
beyond seven years. 
782 P.2d at 193. It is difficult to conceive how the medical malpractice statute of repose 
could be counterproductive like the architects and builders statute or the product liability 
statute. As recognized in Berry, this Court has already accepted the constitutionality of 
the medical malpractice statute of repose. It is therefore unnecessary for the record-7 
-
7
 If this court were to accept plaintiffs' arguments supporting application of an 
standard of review shifting the burden to defendant to establish the existence of a 
medical malpractice insurance crisis and that § 78-14-4 operates to reasonably and 
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in this case to establish that the medical malpractice four-year statute of repose reasonably 
and substantially advances its stated purpose. 
POINT III 
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TWO YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES, BY ITS TERMS 
AND AS A MATTER OF LAW, APPLY TO THE TWO 
MINOR PLAINTIFFS. 
Plaintiffs contend that both Kevin and Patrick Meehan were continuously mentally 
disabled during the seven years between their birth and the commencement of this action. 
Thus, plaintiff argues, they were incapable of understanding the concept of fault and 
discovering their injury within the meaning of the two-year medical malpractice statute 
of limitations.-7 Appellant's Brief, pp. 47-48. Unlike the other issues plaintiffs have 
raised on appeal, this is not a constitutional question, but rather a question of statutory 
interpretation. 
In Hargett Judge Winder considered and rejected the very argument plaintiffs make 
here. The court noted that the actual plaintiff in the action was the guardian ad litem. 
598 F. Supp. at 155. The plaintiffs contended that the neglect of a plaintiff guardian ad 
litem in failing to commence an action should not be attributed to a minor-patient. In 
support of that argument, they cited cases from the child support area indicating that a 
help solve that crisis, it should remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary 
hearing as the Idaho Supreme Court did in Jones v. State Board of Medicine. 555 
P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976). Any other approach would deprive defendant of constitutional 
due process. 
-
7
 As with plaintiffs' argument discussed under Point I, supra, this third issue on 
appeal has no application to the plaintiff parent, Marian Meehan. 
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child's vested right to child support could not be cut off due to the neglect or other failure 
of its parents. Id. 
Judge Winder noted that in Scott v. School Board of Granite School District. 568 
P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), the Utah court "characterized the general tolling provision as an 
expression of 'the general legislative intent to protect the causes of minors'." 598 F. 
Supp. at 156. Judge Winder went on to state: 
By contrast to the weighing process in the area of paternity 
and child support found by the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah 
legislature expressly came to a different conclusion in 
weighing the policies favoring protection of the rights of 
minors with medical malpractice claims against the public's 
interest in containing the costs of medical malpractice 
insurance. 
Id. The Court noted that the express language of the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations was in direct response to the Utah court's pronouncement in Scott of the 
general policy favoring protection of the causes of minors and consequently rejected the 
plaintiffs argument. ML This Court should do the same in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court applied sound precedents of this court to conclude that equal 
treatment of minors and adults under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was a 
constitutionally valid exercise of legislative prerogative. Regardless of the standard of 
review applied under open courts, due process or equal protection analysis, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4 is constitutional as applied to both minors and adults. 
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The action of the Utah Legislature in enacting the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act and its statute of limitations is an appropriate response to a legitimate and real 
concern. It is, after all, the public which ultimately pays the cost of professional liability 
insurance and benefits from the continued availability of such coverage when injuries are 
suffered. In the furtherance of that objective, the Legislature reasonably required all 
persons, including minors, to present claims timely, which is essential to give insurers 
a reasonable opportunity to reduce losses in an extremely volatile insurance market. The 
Legislature also perceived that in medicine, where advances in procedures, knowledge 
and technology occur too rapidly, a long delay in the prosecution of an action seriously 
and detrimentally affects a health care provider's ability to defend care that may have 
been standard when rendered, but which may seem ineffectual or even harmful in 
retrospect. 
It was the legislature's intent that the statute of limitations included in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4 apply to minors and mentally disabled persons in addition to competent 
adults. The district court properly applied the statute to the minor plaintiffs in this case. 
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For the foregoing reasons, defendant/respondent respectfully urge the Court to 
affirm the decision of the court below. 
DATED this ; f f* day of August, 1991. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By 
ELLIQJT J. WILLIAMS 
KURT M. FRANKENBURG 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Respondent, postage prepaid thereon, by first class mail in the United States Mail, to 
Roger P. Chnstensen and Richard L. Evans, CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, 
attorneys for plaintiffs/appellants, 175 South West Temple, Suite 510, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84101, on this p f f i^day of August, 1991. 
1UMIA.0224\3752 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS - A3483 
ELIZABETH KING - A4863 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY GRIFFITHS, as guardian ad 
litem for KEVIN G. MEEHAN, and 
PATRICK B. MEEHAN; and MARIAN FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
J. MEEHAN, OF LAW AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
J. DALLAS VanWAGONER, Civil No. 89-0900111-CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant. 
This action came on regularly for hearing on September 28, 
1990, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, presiding. The plaintiffs appeared by and through their 
counsel, Roger Christensen and Richard Evans of Christensen, 
Jensen & Powell, and defendant appeared by and through his 
counsel, Elizabeth King of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
Defendant moved for dismissal of plaintiffs' Complaint for 
failure to comply with the relevant statute of limitations 
encoded in Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), and 
GC" 
(h^^ 
oris*; 
plaintiffs moved to strike defendant's statute of limitations 
defenses. 
After hearing oral argument and reviewing the memoranda on 
file, the Court now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 27, 1981, Mrs. Marian J. Meehan delivered 
premature twins. 
2. In their Complaint, plaintiffs allege treatment by Dr. 
VanWagoner resulted in brain damage to the twins following 
premature labor and delivery. 
3. The Notice of Intent to Commence a Medical Malpractice 
Action was dated August, 1988. 
4. Since 1976, Utah has adopted a two-year discovery or 
four-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be 
brought unless it is commenced within two years after 
plaintiff or patient discovers or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or 
occurrence. 
Section 78-14-4(1), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1976). 
5. In 1979, the Utah Legislature amended this statute of 
limitations as follows: 
The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, 
regardless of minority or other legal disability . . . . any 
action which under former law could have been commenced more 
than four years after the effective date of this act may be 
commenced only within four years after the effective date of 
this act. 
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Section 78-14-4(2), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1979). 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This action is a medical malpractice action against a 
health care provider, which is governed by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Section 78-14-4(1), et seq., Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended). 
2. The statute of limitations encoded in Section 78-14-
4(1) applies regardless of minority or any other legal disability 
pursuant to Section 78-14-4(2). 
3. Plaintiffs were required as a matter of law to initiate 
their medical malpractice claim within four years after the date 
of the alleged neglect. 
4. Plaintiffs1 Complaint, initiated seven years after the 
medical care here at issue, is absolutely time-barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
5. This Court must bow to the presumption of the validity 
of the Legislature's action in amending the applicable statute of 
limitations so as to specifically apply the statute regardless of 
disability or minority. This Court does not presume to second-
guess the Legislature and will, therefore, not assess the 
strength or weaknesses of plaintiffs' constitutional claims. 
-3-
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, as well as on the memoranda submitted by the parties, the 
Court denies the plaintiffs' Motion to Strike defendant's statute 
of limitations defenses and grants the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and orders that plaintiffs' Complaint be, and the same is 
hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, with each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this rQ 9 day of October, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judge 
23\EKB\10224.574\fincHngs.etc 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARIE B. VAN WENSVEEN, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed in the law office of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendant J. Dallas VanWagoner, M.D. herein; that 
she served the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order (Case No. 890900111CV, Salt Lake County) upon the parties 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope addressed to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Roger P. Christensen, Esq. 
Richard L. Evans, Jr. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the JQtk day of October, 1990. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / (0 CfLday of 
October, 1990. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
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